Abstract-I n this work we propose a pricing schcine which servcs as a n instrument for iiianagiiig con-iiectioiilcss services i n coiiiiection-oriented coiiiinuiiicatioii networks. T h e schcine is able t o allocat,a network bandwidth i n a Pareto-optiiiial way that iiiaxiniizes the t,otal surplus. The key idea is to decompose t h e scrvico provision proccdure aiiioiig three separate parties whose interactions are goveriicd by a set of' coiupctitive pricing mecliaiiisms.
I. IHTRODUCTIOK
Conlieclion-oriented net,works are well-suit,ed to handle interactive ancl real-time applicat,ions such as telephony ancl video conferelicing. However, they will be undernt,ilized if used directly in applications characterized by sporadic behavior and short service time requirements such as iiiail and file transfer. For such applications, in which t,he user information typically consists of a single block of data, connection-oriented services are inefficient due to connect,ion establishment and teardoivii overhead. Such applications are more efficiently handled by a connectionless service which multiplexes data. froin individual applicat,ions into a pre-established virtual connection.
T h e aim of this paper is to propose a method for providing coniiectionless services in a connection-oriented iietwork. (An important instance of this problem, which iiiotivated t,lie present work, is LAN intserconiiection over an ATM network.) Several solutions have been proposed for t,his problem [1, 2, 31. A general discussion of this problem can he found in [4, 5, 61.
The approach proposed in this paper is based on a pricing scheine which allocates the communication resources in a Pareto-optimal way that achieves maxi-I)ortaiit role in any complet,e network architecture. If services were free, there would be no incentive to request, less t,han t,hc hest service the network could pro-\-itle. which would not produce effect.ive utilization of 1 lie i1et.work rcsources. There have been several papers dealing with pricing as a means of resource allocatioii in iiitegratcd net,works, see, e.g., [S, 9, lo]; however, iione risecl it as a. iiiea.ns of providing connectionless traffic slipport, in coiiiiection-orielIled iietworks. In certain aspects, our work falls between i.11~ reservation-orieiited approach in [g, 101 and the besteffort type approach in [8] . Description of the proposed scheme is given in Section 11. Section 111 presents some simulation results and finally in Section IV, coininents and conclusions are given.
11. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In our proposed scheme we introduce a class of agents which we call arbzters to manage the connectionless service. Arbiters are service providers who buy connection-oriented services (bearer services) from the network and sell connectionless services (leleservices) to users. Arbiters operate in a free-competition environment, in certain respects siiniiar to service provisioii by multiIile long-distance phone compaiiies. Thus we have a functionally inodular framework in which there are three layers interacting with each other in a hierarchical manner as sketched in Fig. 1 .
A. The Model
For simplicity of exposition, we consider here a. simple network coiisisting of a single origin-destination pa.ir ( o -d ) connect,ed by a virtual channel of capacity I< channels. Each cliaiiiiel is assumed t,o be a delayless, errorless bit, pipe. An arbiter leases from the network a certain nrirnber of clmiiiels, which we call a 6 7 4 for a fixed "time period t,liat is orders of magnitude longer than the duntion of a typical connectionless service. Periodically, the network holds auctions to serve tho entry or expansion requests of the arbiters. The network charges the arbiters a per-unit-time channel fee of p ( k ) where I; is t,he total niimher of cliannels hired to all the arbiters. expected value of profits exceeds its st,aiidard deviat,ioii. The arhitkr aims at, masiniiziiig its profit through set.t,ing piices t,o tlie teleservices and adjusting its bandwidth given thats the profit, exceeds its standard deviation. We assumed the risk preiiiium to be p ( 4 ) = 0. 
